

Development of a generic voter under FoCal¹

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Context and objectives

The FoCal tool

Development cycle

A simple example : a voter

Voter under FoCal

Conclusion

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Critical systems standards

Mandatory certification by independent authority before commissioning.

- ▶ Certification checks compliance of development with the requirements of applicable standards.
- ▶ Certification emits a judgement, on the conformity of the product with intended purpose.

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Requires :

- ▶ A sharp breakdown of the development in phases (objectives, inputs, activities, outputs)
- ▶ Criteria to close a phase and strict boundaries between phases

Needs a development methodology covering all development phases from the specification to the system commissioning

Objectives

Define a development methodology using FoCal

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- ▶ Propose “FoCal templates” dedicated to each phase
- ▶ Study transcription of normative requirements with their aims into FoCal using features like inheritance, late binding, redefinition, parametrisation. . .
- ▶ Consider automation of documentation to prepare evaluation
- ▶ Consider testing coverage

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Define a development methodology using FoCal

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Apply it on concrete samples

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FoCal

- ▶ Launched in 1998 by T. Hardin and R. Rioboo
- ▶ IDE for a language offering high level mechanisms
- ▶ Conceived to be easy to use by well-trained engineers
- ▶ Unique framework embedding code, proofs, tests and documentation from specification to implementation
- ▶ Provide high-level and justified confidence to users

The core language 1/2

- ▶ *Species* : fundamental entity grouping :
 - ▶ *Representation* : **the** internal data-structure of the species,
 - ▶ *Signatures* : prototype of computational functions,
 - ▶ *Functions* : implementation of signatures using a ML-like language,
 - ▶ *Properties* : first order logical expressions that must hold and will be proved,
 - ▶ *Theorems* : properties with their proof.
- ▶ Multiple inheritance between species, late binding and redefinition.
- ▶ Parameterization of species by collections (flavour of species polymorphism).

The core language 2/2

- ▶ *Complete species* : species with effective data representation, executable functions and all theorems proved.
- ▶ *Collections* : abstraction of the representation of a complete species. It can be seen as a kind of abstract data-type, only usable through its signatures and properties.

The core language 2/2

- ▶ *Complete species* : species with effective data representation, executable functions and all theorems proved.
- ▶ *Collections* : abstraction of the representation of a complete species. It can be seen as a kind of abstract data-type, only usable through its signatures and properties.
- ▶ Consistency between species is ensured by a powerful dependency calculus and a proof system. FoCal compiler keeps track of dependencies between species, their functions, their properties, the proofs. . . to ensure detection of any modification by redefinition

The proof language

Several ways to make a proof for the Coq theorem prover :

1. Easy but discouraged : consider the proof as “assumed”.
2. Helped : a structured proof in the FoCal Proof Language. Each step possibly proved automatically by Zenon which produces a Coq proof term.
3. By “hand” but tricky : write the Coq code of the proof manually.

FoCal compilation 1/2

Species are translated to OCaml and Coq using a unique compilation model. The compilation model uses simple features available in any usual programming languages (structure and first order-modules).

- ▶ Computational methods \Rightarrow OCaml “runable” code and Coq definitions.
- ▶ Logical properties \Rightarrow Coq statements.
- ▶ FoCal proofs \Rightarrow Coq proofs

The whole development is sent to the Coq theorem prover who acts as an assessor.

FoCal compilation 2/2

- ▶ “Documentation” (parsed and kept comments, signatures and properties) are compiled via the FocDoc tool to XML, HTML...
- ▶ “UML class diagram” are automatically generated from FoCal development
- ▶ The tool FocalTest automatically produces the test environment and the drivers to conduct the tests.

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Requirements

Three kinds :

- ▶ *Functional requirements* providing the behaviour of the system independently of any specific design.

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Three kinds :

- ▶ *Functional requirements* providing the behaviour of the system independently of any specific design.
- ▶ *Non-functional requirements* addressing design constraints (response time, memory space available, safety level, COTS to re-use, ...).
- ▶ *Safety requirements* ensuring that the **functional requirements** will never trigger a Feared Event. They can be considered as requirements on the two first kinds of requirements.

Requirements in FoCal

Requirements are expressed as far as possible as properties in FoCal.

- ▶ *Functional requirements* expressed as properties of the form

$$\forall i_1 \text{ in } t_1, \dots, i_n \text{ in } t_n, \\ r1(i_1, i_2, \dots, i_n) \rightarrow r2(i_1, i_2, \dots, i_n, \text{foo}(i_1, i_2, \dots, i_n))$$

- ▶ *Non-functional requirements* usually expressed as comments
- ▶ *Safety requirements* expressed as properties of any form
- ▶ *Glue assumptions* to express properties expected on parameters of species

Development cycle

- ▶ End of specification phase : all safety requirements are proved using the functional requirements and the glue assumptions as hypothesis
- ▶ End of architecture/design phase : all functional requirements are proved using glue assumptions as hypothesis. Needs to introduce the corresponding definitions
- ▶ Implementation phase consists in creating and assembling collections, proving the glue assumptions
- ▶ Testing phases : help in validating non functional requirements, partially proved properties and external components based on their properties
- ▶ Maintenance phase using late binding and redefinition

Use of the FoCaL dependencies calculus and documentation generation to generate formal traceability between phases.

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Generic definition

Elaboration of an output from input values given by redundant components

Basic principles

- ▶ to compare its input values according to a given consistency relation
- ▶ to output one value depending on a voting policy

Generic definition

Elaboration of an output from input values given by redundant components


Basic principles

- ▶ to compare its input values according to a given consistency relation
- ▶ to output one value depending on a voting policy

Functional requirements

- ▶ Reliable and correct choice of one non faulty input among its n inputs
- ▶ detection of faulty inputs
- ▶ Localisation of the source of the error and report of a diagnosis related to it

Generic definition



Safety requirements

A voter returns one of its input values or no value can be chosen

$$\forall v1, v2, v3 \text{ in value}, s = \text{vote}(v1, v2, v3) \rightarrow$$
$$\text{value}(s) \in \{v1, v2, v3\} \vee \neg \text{valid}(\text{diag}(s))$$

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
Returned values for different input value orders are compatible

$$\forall v1, v2, v3 \text{ in value}, s1 = \text{vote}(v1, v2, v3) \wedge s2 = \text{vote}(v3, v1, v2) \\ \rightarrow \text{compatible}(s1, s2)$$

Outputs are compatible if values fit consistency rule or values are not valid

$$\forall (v1, d1), (v2, d2) \text{ in } (\text{value} * \text{diag}), \\ \text{compatible}((v1, d1), (v2, d2)) \rightarrow \\ (\text{valid}(d1) \wedge \text{valid}(d2) \wedge \text{consistency_rule}(v1, v2)) \vee \\ (\neg \text{valid}(d1) \wedge \neg \text{valid}(d2))$$

2003 voter specification



Perfect_match, v1



Partial_match, v1



Range_match, v1



No_match

2oo3 voter specification

Consistency between inputs			Returned Value	Diag	
v1 and v2	v1 and v3	v2 and v3		Index	Qualifier
Yes	Yes	Yes	v1	sensor_1	perfect_match
Yes	Yes	No	v1	sensor_1	partial_match
Yes	No	Yes	v2	sensor_2	partial_match
No	Yes	Yes	v2	sensor_3	partial_match
Yes	No	No	v1	sensor_3	range_match
No	Yes	No	v3	sensor_2	range_match
No	No	Yes	v2	sensor_1	range_match
No	No	No	?	?	no_match

2oo3 architecture

A 2 steps algorithm :

- ▶ the *inputs comparison*, which takes 2 or more inputs and compares them according to a "consistency law"
- ▶ the *arbitration*, voting policy algorithm which produces the output value.

We focus on the arbitration part of the voter. The complete development is available as a FoCal's contrib.

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
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Generic voter specification architecture



The generic voter requirements in FoCal

```

species Gen_voter( V is Gen_value , Diag is Gen_diag) =

signature vote in V -> V -> V -> (V * Diag);

(* Shortcut to extract the value *)
let output_value(p in V * Diag) in V = basics#fst(p);
let output_diag(p in V * Diag) in V = basics#snd(p);

(* Safety requirements of a voter *)
property voter_returns_an_input_value :
all v1 v2 v3 in V,
    output_value(vote(v1, v2, v3)) = v1
  \/\ output_value(vote(v1, v2, v3)) = v2
  \/\ output_value(vote(v1, v2, v3)) = v3
  \/\ ~(Diag!valid (output_diag (voter (v1, v2, v3))))


(* Glue assumption on generic values *)
property consistency_rule_is_reflexive :
    all v1 in V, V!consistency_rule (v1, v1);
end;;

```

The 2003 voter requirements

- ▶ species `Voter` inherits from the generic voter
- ▶ defines the 2003 voter functional requirements
- ▶ provides proofs of the safety properties based on voter functional requirements and glue assumptions

2oo3 specification architecture



The 2003 voter requirements in FoCal

```

species Voter
  (E is Sp_etat_vote , C is Sp_captteur , V is Gen_value , P is
    Diag_2003 (E, C)) =
    inherit Gen_voter (V, P);

(* Functional definition of the majority vote
  Vote with 3 equivalent values returns a perfect_match
  and the value of the first sensor. *)
property vote_perfect :
  all v1 v2 v3 in V,
    (V!consistency_rule (v1, v2) /\
     V!consistency_rule (v2, v3) /\
     V!consistency_rule (v1, v3)) ->
    ((value (voter (v1, v2, v3)) = v1) /\
     (diag (voter (v1, v2, v3)) =
      P!constr (C!capt_1, E!perfect_match)));

proof of voter_returns_an_input_value =
  ...
end ;;

```

The 2003 voter implementation

- ▶ species `Imp_Voter` inherits from the 2003 voter
- ▶ implements the 2003 voter functional requirements
- ▶ provides proofs of the voter properties based on voter definition and glue assumptions

The 2003 voter implementation in FoCal

```

species Imp_vote
  (E is Sp_etat_vote , C is Sp_captreur , V is Gen_value , P is
    Diag_2003 (E, C)) =

  inherit Voteur (E, C, V, P);

  let voter (v1 in V, v2 in V, v3 in V) in V * P =
    let c1 = V!consistency_rule (v1, v2) in
    let c2 = V!consistency_rule (v1, v3) in
    let c3 = V!consistency_rule (v2, v3) in
    if c1 then ...

  proof of vote_perfect =
    by property V!equal_reflexive , P!equal_reflexive
      definition of voter, diag, value;

  ...
end;;

```

Getting the 2003 voter collection

- ▶ complete species `Imp_vote` by providing proofs of the glue assumptions of the parameters
- ▶ build collections for the parameters
- ▶ collection `Coll_Voter` implements the complete species

The 2003 voter collection in FoCal

```
species Sp_int_imp_vote_tol =  
  
  inherit  
    Imp_vote (Coll_etat_vote , Coll_captteur ,  
              Coll_int_imp_value_tol , Coll_diag);  
  
  (proof of the glue assumptions *)  
  proof of consistency_rule_is_symmetric =  
    by property Coll_int_imp_value_tol!  
      consistency_rule_symmetric;  
  proof of consistency_rule_is_reflexive =  
    by property Coll_int_imp_value_tol!  
      consistency_rule_reflexive;  
  
end;;  
  
collection Coll_int_imp_vote_tol =  
  
  implement Sp_int_imp_vote_tol;  
  
end;;
```

The 2003 voter execution

```
Voter on integers with a margin of error of 2
1, 3, 5 --> val : 3 , diag : (capt_2, partial_match)
1, 1, 5 --> val : 1 , diag : (capt_3, range_match)
4, 5, 5 --> val : 4 , diag : (capt_1, perfect_match)
1, 4, 7 --> val : 1 , diag : (capt_1, no_match)

Voter on integer with a validity bit
( 23, valid), ( 45, valid), ( 23, valid)
  --> val : ( 23, valid) , diag : (capt_2, range_match)

( 23, invalid), ( 45, valid), ( 23, valid)
  --> val : ( 23, invalid) , diag : (capt_1, no_match)
```

Other works in FoCal

Realistic works with FoCal :

- ▶ Standard library providing common data structures,
- ▶ Formal calculus library (R. Rioboo)
- ▶ Certification of an airport security regulation (J.F. Etienne)
- ▶ Access control Library (M. Jaume, C. Morisset)
- ▶ Nested automatas (P. Ayrault)

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- ▶ Definition of an usable methodology to apply to critical software development taking advantage of one language for covering all phases.

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- ▶ Experimentation that FoCal is easy to use and to understand by engineers without knowledge on higher order features
- ▶ Demonstration that FoCal offers a good compromise between development expressivity and compliance with normative requirements

Future works

Based on this normative development cycle for FoCal developments, we explore other features required by standards like :

- ▶ dysfunctional analysis based on dataflow
- ▶ impact analysis
- ▶ reactive language features

Thank you for your attention.

FoCal tool can be downloaded from
<http://focalize.inria.fr/>.

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